Internet-Draft Fully-Specified Algorithms February 2025
Jones & Steele Expires 24 August 2025 [Page]
Workgroup:
JOSE Working Group
Internet-Draft:
draft-ietf-jose-fully-specified-algorithms-07
Updates:
7518, 8037, 8152, 9053 (if approved)
Published:
Intended Status:
Standards Track
Expires:
Authors:
M.B. Jones
Self-Issued Consulting
O. Steele
Transmute

Fully-Specified Algorithms for JOSE and COSE

Abstract

This specification refers to cryptographic algorithm identifiers that fully specify the cryptographic operations to be performed, including any curve, key derivation function (KDF), hash functions, etc., as being "fully specified". Whereas, it refers to cryptographic algorithm identifiers that require additional information beyond the algorithm identifier to determine the cryptographic operations to be performed as being "polymorphic". This specification creates fully-specified algorithm identifiers for registered JOSE and COSE polymorphic algorithm identifiers, enabling applications to use only fully-specified algorithm identifiers.

Status of This Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

This Internet-Draft will expire on 24 August 2025.

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Table of Contents

1. Introduction

The IANA algorithm registries for JOSE [IANA.JOSE] and COSE [IANA.COSE] contain two kinds of algorithm identifiers:

Fully Specified
Those that fully determine the cryptographic operations to be performed, including any curve, key derivation function (KDF), hash functions, etc. Examples are RS256 and ES256K in both JOSE and COSE and ES256 in JOSE.
Polymorphic
Those requiring information beyond the algorithm identifier to determine the cryptographic operations to be performed. Such additional information could include the actual key value and a curve that it uses. Examples are EdDSA in both JOSE and COSE and ES256 in COSE.

This matters because many protocols negotiate supported operations using only algorithm identifiers. For instance, OAuth Authorization Server Metadata [RFC8414] uses negotiation parameters like these (from an example in the specification):

  "token_endpoint_auth_signing_alg_values_supported":
    ["RS256", "ES256"]

OpenID Connect Discovery [OpenID.Discovery] likewise negotiates supported algorithms using alg and enc values. W3C Web Authentication [WebAuthn] and FIDO Client to Authenticator Protocol (CTAP) [FIDO2] negotiate using COSE alg numbers.

This does not work for polymorphic algorithms. For instance, with EdDSA, you do not know which of the curves Ed25519 and/or Ed448 are supported! This causes real problems in practice.

WebAuthn contains this de-facto algorithm definition to work around this problem:

  -8 (EdDSA), where crv is 6 (Ed25519)

This redefines the COSE EdDSA algorithm identifier for the purposes of WebAuthn to restrict it to using the Ed25519 curve - making it non-polymorphic so that algorithm negotiation can succeed, but also effectively eliminating the possibility of using Ed448. Other similar workarounds for polymorphic algorithm identifiers are used in practice.

Note that using fully-specified algorithms is sometimes referred to as the "cipher suite" approach; using polymorphic algorithms is sometimes referred to as the "à la carte" approach.

This specification creates fully-specified algorithm identifiers for registered polymorphic JOSE and COSE algorithms and their parameters, enabling applications to use only fully-specified algorithm identifiers. It furthermore deprecates the practice of registering polymorphic algorithm identifiers.

1.1. Requirements Notation and Conventions

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

2. Fully-Specified Digital Signature Algorithm Identifiers

This section creates fully-specified digital signature algorithm identifiers for a set of registered polymorphic JOSE and COSE algorithms and their parameters.

2.1. Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA)

[RFC9053] defines the current use of the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) by COSE. The COSE algorithm registrations for ECDSA are polymorphic, since they do not specify the curve used. For instance, ES256 is defined as "ECDSA w/ SHA-256" in Section 2.1 of [RFC9053]. (The corresponding JOSE registrations in [RFC7518] are full-specified.)

The following fully-specified COSE ECDSA algorithms are defined:

Table 1: ECDSA Algorithm Values
Name COSE Value Description COSE Recommended
ESP256 TBD (requested assignment -9) ECDSA using P-256 curve and SHA-256 Yes
ESP384 TBD (requested assignment -48) ECDSA using P-384 curve and SHA-384 Yes
ESP512 TBD (requested assignment -49) ECDSA using P-521 curve and SHA-512 Yes
ESB256 TBD (requested assignment -261) ECDSA using BrainpoolP256r1 curve and SHA-256 No
ESB320 TBD (requested assignment -262) ECDSA using BrainpoolP320r1 curve and SHA-384 No
ESB384 TBD (requested assignment -263) ECDSA using BrainpoolP384r1 curve and SHA-384 No
ESB512 TBD (requested assignment -264) ECDSA using BrainpoolP512r1 curve and SHA-512 No

2.2. Edwards-Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (EdDSA)

[RFC8037] defines the current use of the Edwards-Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (EdDSA) by JOSE and [RFC9053] defines its current use by COSE. Both register polymorphic EdDSA algorithm identifiers.

The following fully-specified JOSE and COSE EdDSA algorithms are defined:

Table 2: EdDSA Algorithm Values
Name COSE Value Description JOSE Implementation Requirements COSE Recommended
Ed25519 TBD (requested assignment -50) EdDSA using Ed25519 curve Optional Yes
Ed448 TBD (requested assignment -51) EdDSA using Ed448 curve Optional Yes

3. Fully-Specified Encryption

This section describes the construction of fully-specified encryption algorithm identifiers in the context of existing the JOSE and COSE encryption schemes JSON Web Encryption, (JWE) as described in [RFC7516] and [RFC7518], and COSE Encrypt, as described in [RFC9052] and [RFC9053].

Using fully-specified encryption algorithms enables the sender and receiver to agree on all mandatory security parameters. They also enable protocols to specify an allow list of algorithm combinations that does not include polymorphic combinations, prventing problems such as cross-curve key establishment, cross-mode symmetric encryption, or mismatched KDF size to symmetric key scenarios.

Both JOSE and COSE have operations that take multiple algorithms as parameters. Encrypted objects in JOSE [RFC7516] use two algorithm identifiers: the first in the "alg" (Algorithm) Header Parameter, which specifies how to determine the content encryption key, and the second in the "enc" (Encryption Algorithm) Header Parameter, which specifies the content encryption algorithm. Likewise, encrypted COSE objects can use multiple algorithms for corresponding purposes. This section describes how to fully specify encryption algorithms for JOSE and COSE.

To perform fully-specified encryption in JOSE, the "alg" value MUST specify all essential parameters for key establishment or derive some of them from the accompanying "enc" value and the "enc" value MUST specify all essential parameters for symmetric encryption. For example, JWE encryption using an "alg" value of "A128KW" (AES Key Wrap using 128-bit key) and an "enc" value of "A128GCM" (AES GCM using 128-bit key) uses fully-specified algorithms.

Note that in JOSE, there is the option to derive some cryptographic parameters used in the "alg" computation from the accompanying "enc" value. An example of this is that the keydatalen KDF parameter value for "ECDH-ES" is determined from the "enc" value, as described in Section 4.6.2 of [RFC7518]. For the purposes of an "alg" value being fully-specified, deriving parameters from "enc" does not make the algorithm polymorphic, as the computation is still fully determined by the algorithm identifiers used. This option is not present in COSE.

To perform fully-specified encryption in COSE, the outer "alg" value MUST specify all essential parameters for key establishment and the inner "alg" value must specify all essential parameters for symmetric encryption. For example, COSE encryption using an outer "alg" value of A128KW and an inner "alg" value of A128GCM uses fully-specified algorithms.

While this specification provides a definition of what fully-specified encryption algorithm identifiers are for both JOSE and COSE, it does not deprecate any polymorphic encryption algorithms, since replacements for them are not provided by this specification. This is discussed in Section 6.2.

3.1. Fully-Specified Encryption Algorithms

Many of the registered JOSE and COSE algorithms used for encryption are already fully-specified. This section discusses them.

All the symmetric encryption algorithms registered by [RFC7518] and [RFC9053] are fully-specified. An example of a fully-specified symmetric encryption algorithm is "A128GCM" (AES GCM using 128-bit key).

In both JOSE and COSE, all registered key wrapping algorithms are fully specified, as are the key wrapping with AES GCM algorithms. An example of a fully-specified key wrapping algorithm is "A128KW" (AES Key Wrap using 128-bit key).

The JOSE "dir" and COSE "direct" algorithms are fully specified. The COSE direct+HKDF algorithms are fully specified.

The JOSE Key Encryption with PBES2 algorithms are fully specified.

3.2. Polymorphic Encryption Algorithms

Some of the registered JOSE and COSE algorithms used for encryption are polymorphic. This section discusses them.

The ECDH key establishment algorithms in both JOSE and COSE are polymorphic because they do not specify the elliptic curve to be used for the key. This is true of the ephemeral key for the Ephemeral-Static (ES) algorithms registered for JOSE and COSE and of the static key for the Static-Static (SS) algorithms registered by COSE. See more discussion of ECDH algorithms in Section 6.2.

4. IANA Considerations

4.1. JOSE Algorithms Registrations

This section registers the following values in the IANA "JSON Web Signature and Encryption Algorithms" registry [IANA.JOSE] established by [RFC7515].

4.1.1. Fully-Specified JOSE Algorithm Registrations

  • Algorithm Name: Ed25519

  • Algorithm Description: EdDSA using Ed25519 curve

  • Algorithm Usage Locations: alg

  • JOSE Implementation Requirements: Optional

  • Change Controller: IETF

  • Reference: Section 2.2 of [[ this specification ]]

  • Algorithm Analysis Document(s): [RFC8032]

  • Algorithm Name: Ed448

  • Algorithm Description: EdDSA using Ed448 curve

  • Algorithm Usage Locations: alg

  • JOSE Implementation Requirements: Optional

  • Change Controller: IETF

  • Reference: Section 2.2 of [[ this specification ]]

  • Algorithm Analysis Document(s): [RFC8032]

4.1.2. Deprecated Polymorphic JOSE Algorithm Registrations

The following registration is updated to change its status to Deprecated.

  • Algorithm Name: EdDSA

  • Algorithm Description: EdDSA signature algorithms

  • Algorithm Usage Locations: alg

  • JOSE Implementation Requirements: Deprecated

  • Change Controller: IETF

  • Reference: Section 2.2 of [[ this specification ]]

  • Algorithm Analysis Document(s): [RFC8032]

4.2. COSE Algorithms Registrations

This section registers the following values in the IANA "COSE Algorithms" registry [IANA.COSE].

4.2.1. Fully-Specified COSE Algorithm Registrations

  • Name: ESP256

  • Value: TBD (requested assignment -9)

  • Description: ECDSA using P-256 curve and SHA-256

  • Capabilities: [kty]

  • Change Controller: IETF

  • Reference: Section 2.1 of [[ this specification ]]

  • Recommended: Yes

  • Name: ESP384

  • Value: TBD (requested assignment -48)

  • Description: ECDSA using P-384 curve and SHA-384

  • Capabilities: [kty]

  • Change Controller: IETF

  • Reference: Section 2.1 of [[ this specification ]]

  • Recommended: Yes

  • Name: ESP512

  • Value: TBD (requested assignment -49)

  • Description: ECDSA using P-521 curve and SHA-512

  • Capabilities: [kty]

  • Change Controller: IETF

  • Reference: Section 2.1 of [[ this specification ]]

  • Recommended: Yes

  • Name: ESB256

  • Value: TBD (requested assignment -261)

  • Description: ECDSA using BrainpoolP256r1 curve and SHA-256

  • Capabilities: [kty]

  • Change Controller: IETF

  • Reference: Section 2.1 of [[ this specification ]]

  • Recommended: No

  • Name: ESB320

  • Value: TBD (requested assignment -262)

  • Description: ECDSA using BrainpoolP320r1 curve and SHA-384

  • Capabilities: [kty]

  • Change Controller: IETF

  • Reference: Section 2.1 of [[ this specification ]]

  • Recommended: No

  • Name: ESB384

  • Value: TBD (requested assignment -263)

  • Description: ECDSA using BrainpoolP384r1 curve and SHA-384

  • Capabilities: [kty]

  • Change Controller: IETF

  • Reference: Section 2.1 of [[ this specification ]]

  • Recommended: No

  • Name: ESB512

  • Value: TBD (requested assignment -264)

  • Description: ECDSA using BrainpoolP512r1 curve and SHA-512

  • Capabilities: [kty]

  • Change Controller: IETF

  • Reference: Section 2.1 of [[ this specification ]]

  • Recommended: No

  • Name: Ed25519

  • Value: TBD (requested assignment -50)

  • Description: EdDSA using Ed25519 curve

  • Capabilities: [kty]

  • Change Controller: IETF

  • Reference: Section 2.2 of [[ this specification ]]

  • Recommended: Yes

  • Name: Ed448

  • Value: TBD (requested assignment -51)

  • Description: EdDSA using Ed448 curve

  • Capabilities: [kty]

  • Change Controller: IETF

  • Reference: Section 2.2 of [[ this specification ]]

  • Recommended: Yes

4.2.2. Deprecated Polymorphic COSE Algorithm Registrations

The following registrations are updated to change their status to Deprecated.

  • Name: ES256

  • Value: -7

  • Description: ECDSA w/ SHA-256

  • Capabilities: [kty]

  • Change Controller: IETF

  • Reference: RFC 9053

  • Recommended: Deprecated

  • Name: ES384

  • Value: -35

  • Description: ECDSA w/ SHA-384

  • Capabilities: [kty]

  • Change Controller: IETF

  • Reference: RFC 9053

  • Recommended: Deprecated

  • Name: ES512

  • Value: -36

  • Description: ECDSA w/ SHA-512

  • Capabilities: [kty]

  • Change Controller: IETF

  • Reference: RFC 9053

  • Recommended: Deprecated

  • Name: EdDSA

  • Value: -8

  • Description: EdDSA

  • Capabilities: [kty]

  • Change Controller: IETF

  • Reference: RFC 9053

  • Recommended: Deprecated

4.3. Updated Review Instructions for Designated Experts

4.3.1. JSON Web Signature and Encryption Algorithms

IANA is directed to preserve the current reference to RFC 7518, and to add a reference to this section of this specification.

The review instructions for the designated experts for the IANA "JSON Web Signature and Encryption Algorithms" registry [IANA.JOSE] in Section 7.1 of [RFC7518] have been updated to include an additional review criterion:

  • Only fully-specified algorithm identifiers may be registered. Polymorphic algorithm identifiers must not be registered.

4.3.2. COSE Algorithms

IANA is directed to preserve the current references to RFC 9053 and RFC 9054, and to add a reference to this section of this specification.

The review instructions for the designated experts for the IANA "COSE Algorithms" registry [IANA.COSE] in Section 10.4 of [RFC9053] have been updated to include an additional review criterion:

  • Only fully-specified algorithm identifiers may be registered. Polymorphic algorithm identifiers must not be registered.

4.4. Defining Deprecated and Prohibited

The terms "Deprecated" and "Prohibited" as used by JOSE and COSE registrations are currently undefined. Furthermore, while in [RFC7518] JOSE specifies that both "Deprecated" and "Prohibited" can be used, in [RFC8152] COSE specifies the use of "Deprecated" but not "Prohibited". (Note that [RFC9053] did not carry the definitions of the "Recommended" registry columns forward, so [RFC8152] remains definitive in this regard.) This section defines these terms for use by both JOSE and COSE IANA registrations in a consistent manner, eliminating this potentially confusing inconsistency.

For purposes of use in the "JOSE Implementation Requirements" columns in the IANA JOSE registries [IANA.JOSE] and in the "Recommended" columns in the IANA COSE registries [IANA.COSE], these terms are defined as follows:

Deprecated
There is a preferred mechanism to achieve similar functionality to that referenced by the identifier; this replacement functionality SHOULD be utilized in new deployments in preference to the deprecated identifier, unless there exist documented operational or regulatory requirments that prevent migration away from the deprecated identifier.
Prohibited
The identifier and the functionality that it references MUST NOT be used. (Identifiers MAY be designated as "Prohibited" due to security flaws, for instance.)

Note that the terms "Deprecated" and "Prohibited" have been used with a multiplicity of different meanings in various specifications, sometimes without actually being defined in those specifications. For instance, the term "Deprecated" is used in the title of [RFC8996], but the actual specification text uses the terminology "MUST NOT be used".

The definitions above were chosen because they are consistent with all existing registrations in both JOSE and COSE; none will need to change. Furthermore, they are consistent with their existing usage in JOSE. The only net change is to enable a clear distinction between "Deprecated" and "Prohibited" in future COSE registrations.

5. Key Representations

The key representations for the new fully-specified algorithms defined by this specification are the same as those for the polymorphic algorithms that they replace, other than the alg value, if included. For instance, the representation for a key used with the Ed25519 algorithm is the same as that specified in [RFC8037], except that the alg value would be Ed25519 rather than EdDSA, if included.

6. Notes on Algorithms Not Updated

The working group has discussed some existing polymorphic algorithms that are not updated by this specification. This section discusses why they have not been updated.

6.1. RSA Signing Algorithms

The working group has discussed whether the RS256, RS384, and RS512 algorithms should be considered fully-specified or not, because they can operate on keys of different sizes. For instance, they can use both 2048- and 4096-bit keys. The same is true of the PS* algorithms.

This document does not describe or request registration of any fully specified RSA algorithms. Some RSA signing implementations, such as FIPS-compliant Hardware Security Modules (HSMs) [FIPS.140-3] limit RSA key parameters to specific values with acceptable security characteristics. This approach could be extended to define fully-specified RSA algorithms in the future.

That said, should it be useful at some point to have RSA algorithm identifiers that are specific to particular key characteristics, a future specification could always register them.

6.2. ECDH Key Agreement Algorithms

The working group decided not to update the Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) algorithms at this time, but to describe how to potentially do so in the future, if needed. The registered JOSE and COSE ECDH algorithms are polymorphic because they do not specify the curve to be used for the ephemeral key.

Fully-specified versions of these algorithms would specify all choices needed, including the KDF and the curve. For instance, an algorithm performing ECDH-ES using the Concat KDF and the P-256 curve, would be fully-specified and could be defined and registered. While there was not an appetite in the working group to define and register such replacement algorithms at this time, other specifications could do so in the future, if desired.

6.3. HSS/LMS Hash-Based Digital Signature Algorithm

The HSS-LMS algorithm registered by COSE is polymorphic. It is polymorphic because the algorithm identifier does not specify the hash function to be used. Like ECDH, the working group did not propose to register replacement algorithms, but future specifications could do so.

7. Security Considerations

The security considerations for ECDSA in [RFC7518], for EdDSA in [RFC8037], and for ECDSA and EdDSA in [RFC9053] apply.

The security considerations for preventing cross-mode attacks described in [RFC9459] apply.

A cryptographic key SHOULD be used with only a single algorithm, unless the use of the same key with different algorithms is proven secure. See [Reuse25519] for an example of such a proof. As a result, it is RECOMMENDED that the algorithm parameter of JSON Web Keys and COSE Keys be present, unless there exists some other mechanism for ensuring the key is used as intended.

In COSE, preventing cross-mode attacks, such as those described in [RFC9459], can be accomplished in two ways:

  1. Allow only authenticated content encryption algorithms.

  2. Bind the the potentially unauthenticated content encryption algorithm to be used into the key protection algorithm so that different content encryption algorithms result in different content encryption keys.

Which choice to use in which circumstances is beyond the scope of this specification.

8. References

8.1. Normative References

[RFC2119]
Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC7515]
Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Signature (JWS)", RFC 7515, DOI 10.17487/RFC7515, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7515>.
[RFC7516]
Jones, M. and J. Hildebrand, "JSON Web Encryption (JWE)", RFC 7516, DOI 10.17487/RFC7516, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7516>.
[RFC8037]
Liusvaara, I., "CFRG Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) and Signatures in JSON Object Signing and Encryption (JOSE)", RFC 8037, DOI 10.17487/RFC8037, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8037>.
[RFC8174]
Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC9052]
Schaad, J., "CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE): Structures and Process", STD 96, RFC 9052, DOI 10.17487/RFC9052, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9052>.
[RFC9053]
Schaad, J., "CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE): Initial Algorithms", RFC 9053, DOI 10.17487/RFC9053, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9053>.

8.2. Informative References

[FIDO2]
Bradley, J., Hodges, J., Jones, M., Kumar, A., Lindemann, R., and J. Johan, "Client to Authenticator Protocol (CTAP)", FIDO Alliance Proposed Standard, , <https://fidoalliance.org/specs/fido-v2.1-ps-20210615/fido-client-to-authenticator-protocol-v2.1-ps-errata-20220621.html>.
[FIPS.140-3]
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), "Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules", FIPS PUB 140-3, , <https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.140-3.pdf>.
[IANA.COSE]
IANA, "CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE)", <https://www.iana.org/assignments/cose/>.
[IANA.JOSE]
IANA, "JSON Object Signing and Encryption (JOSE)", <https://www.iana.org/assignments/jose/>.
[OpenID.Discovery]
Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., Jones, M.B., and E. Jay, "OpenID Connect Discovery 1.0", , <https://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-discovery-1_0.html>.
[Reuse25519]
Thormarker, E., "On using the same key pair for Ed25519 and an X25519 based KEM", , <https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/509.pdf>.
[RFC7518]
Jones, M., "JSON Web Algorithms (JWA)", RFC 7518, DOI 10.17487/RFC7518, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7518>.
[RFC8032]
Josefsson, S. and I. Liusvaara, "Edwards-Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (EdDSA)", RFC 8032, DOI 10.17487/RFC8032, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8032>.
[RFC8152]
Schaad, J., "CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE)", RFC 8152, DOI 10.17487/RFC8152, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8152>.
[RFC8414]
Jones, M., Sakimura, N., and J. Bradley, "OAuth 2.0 Authorization Server Metadata", RFC 8414, DOI 10.17487/RFC8414, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8414>.
[RFC8996]
Moriarty, K. and S. Farrell, "Deprecating TLS 1.0 and TLS 1.1", BCP 195, RFC 8996, DOI 10.17487/RFC8996, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8996>.
[RFC9459]
Housley, R. and H. Tschofenig, "CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE): AES-CTR and AES-CBC", RFC 9459, DOI 10.17487/RFC9459, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9459>.
[WebAuthn]
Hodges, J., Jones, J.C., Jones, M.B., Kumar, A., and E. Lundberg, "Web Authentication: An API for accessing Public Key Credentials - Level 2", World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) Recommendation, , <https://www.w3.org/TR/2021/REC-webauthn-2-20210408/>.

Appendix A. Document History

[[ to be removed by the RFC Editor before publication as an RFC ]]

-07

-06

-05

-04

-03

-02

-01

-00

Acknowledgements

The authors thank Carsten Bormann, John Bradley, Tim Bray, Brian Campbell, Deb Cooley, Stephen Farrell, Ilari Liusvaara, Tobias Looker, Neil Madden, John Preuß Mattsson, Jeremy O'Donoghue, Anders Rundgren, Göran Selander, Filip Skokan, Oliver Terbu, Hannes Tschofenig, and David Waite for their contributions to this specification.

Authors' Addresses

Michael B. Jones
Self-Issued Consulting
URI: https://self-issued.info/
Orie Steele
Transmute